05/08/2024

China: the internal risks of a war over Taiwan

Despite the apparent internal consensus among China's leadership about the inevitability of an armed conflict in the Strait to ensure reunification between the mainland and the 'rebel province' of Taiwan, there is no unanimity within the party regarding the benefits the country would gain from initiating a war whose direct and indirect internal-external costs are still being assessed, despite the prevailing assumption of a rapid military victory. In this regard, the ambivalent Chinese narrative and, in particular, President Xi Jinping's position reaffirm expectations of a future peaceful reunification with Taiwan, but at the same time clearly indicate that the country does not renounce the eventual use of force to achieve this goal; in fact, the increase in military spending and the plans for modernizing its conventional, nuclear, and missile forces demonstrate these convictions, giving China significant chances of successfully (re)conquering a province with 'separatist intentions'.

China: evolution of the defense budget

The factual observation of periodic military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, which have even included Russian forces as well as occasional incidents between Chinese and American forces, has escalated tensions as China enters a period of economic slowdown, Taiwan reaffirms its status as a democracy governed by a party considered pro-independence by China, and the 'Taiwanese identity' is asserted over the 'common cultural heritage,' demonstrating the generational preference for a Taiwan politically, economically, and even culturally separate from the mainland.

Fuente: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwán

 

Other factors must also be considered when evaluating potential repercussions of a Chinese invasion. Firstly, internal criticisms of President Xi's leadership highlight that such an action would primarily serve to revitalize a leadership under scrutiny as the crucial year 2027 approaches, when his third presidential term ends. He would therefore seek to exercise constitutional and statutory prerogatives he has imposed regarding the lifelong exercise of power and be re-elected for a new five-year term. However, this scenario may be disrupted as his continuity would depend on how the national economy evolves and his ability to manage intra-party challenges, despite having spent more than a decade trying to neutralize all internal opposition.

For Xi personally, if he were to achieve reunification with Taiwan, his prestige would surpass the heroic history of the Great Helmsman Mao Zedong, positioning him at the epicenter of modern history and thus achieving the long-desired goal of the “rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation with the “unification of the homeland.” If this were the case, the internal challenge lies in having moderate sectors curb his personalism and aspirations for historical centrality to channel them towards the construction of a more open and developed China, and not one that is partially destroyed and internationally condemned for using war as a method of political survival. In this interpretative line, his nationalist stances do not necessarily garner the sympathy of the entire party leadership, who remain silent about their divergences but calculate that, sooner or later, they will have to take up the mantle of an until-now invisible leadership and do not wish (as mayors and/or governors) to do so over the ashes of a country semi-destroyed by bombings and socially convulsed. The loss of lives in China could further erode the public image of the Party, already questioned due to the harsh confinement strategy imposed during the Covid pandemic, economic slowdown, and rising youth unemployment.
 

It is also necessary to consider the will of the people and government of Taiwan to resist an attack (alone or with the help of the United States) in defense of what they consider their country. In this regard, China has seen how Putin's Russia initiated a costly war in Ukraine and how a poorly calculated military operation could weaken China despite an apparent military victory. It is estimated that Taiwan has advanced American weaponry and has been preparing for a possible Chinese invasion for years.
 

The impacts at the international level will be varied and profound. Today, China plays an important role as a peacemaker (Ukraine-Russia, Iran-Saudi Arabia, and working to achieve an agreement between pro-Palestinian factions Hamas and Al Fatah), so a war in the Strait would lead to economic sanctions being applied and international discredit, eroding its reputation as a "global mediator" and key actor in the governance of the international system.
 

A recent study published by the RAND Corp. contributes to these reflections; based on surveys conducted with diplomats and academics from countries considered "middle powers" such as Australia, Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom; the findings show that the respondents do not share American fears that a massive Chinese military buildup and Xi Jinping's determination to "reunify" Taiwan are steps toward war. Instead, they are seen as indicators of a "nationalist stance" intended to mend fissures in the internal consensus. According to the conclusions, "...the main objective of China is to legitimize its current internal political system (i.e., the government of the Chinese Communist Party) … " and, for this, "...China must be seen internally as a great power, preeminent in Asia and capable of achieving high economic growth. An invasion of Taiwan would endanger such perceptions and, therefore, would be considered an unacceptable risk in relation to the status quo…".
 

In conclusion, following the conclusion of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the central decision of the party's senior leadership is to drive the transformation of the economy and achieve a "new, quality productive force," meaning to steer China towards a model centered on innovation and new technologies, rather than towards a war whose costs could exceed the supposed benefits.
 

Sergio Cesarin is a researcher at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council of Argentina (CONICET). He is a professor in the Master's program in Economics and Business with Asia-Pacific and India, and the Coordinator of the Center for Studies on Asia-Pacific and India (CEAPI) at the National University of Tres de Febrero (UNTREF).