18/06/2024

What are the French afraid of?

In a recent article published here, my friend Anibal Jozami deciphers the results of the European elections that have just been held. In the conclusion of his analysis, which is relevant, he notes: "Europe seems to have shifted to the right, but not to its extreme declination, and there is nothing to indicate that it has abandoned its integrative and Europeanist vocation." I share the observations, as well as the rather reassuring conclusion for anyone who relies on a form of continuity and stability in a disruptive and volatile world. In its new composition, the European Parliament in Strasbourg should normally reflect the choice made by the majority of voters, from the western tip of Ireland to the Polish border with Russia and from the Finnish Arctic Circle to Cyprus, a stone's throw from the Middle East, or Algeciras on the borders of the African continent. Nothing could profoundly upset the continental balances at a time when two major conflicts are raging two hours by plane from Rome, and when the upcoming American elections are expected to have a significant impact on the people of the United States and, consequently, given Washington's international influence, on the planet as a whole.

One election can hide another
Obviously, the announced continuity of the Union should not hide the upheavals that are shaking several Member States; it will not necessarily result in guaranteed stability in all countries. The case of France in particular deserves our attention because it is so special.
On the evening of the election, noting a tidal wave of protests against him and benefiting the radical right of Marine Le Pen, who was the leading party in France for the very first time, President Emmanuel Macron used one of his constitutional prerogatives and dissolved the National Assembly. In doing so, he called legislative elections that will take place in two rounds on June 30 and July 7. It is true that, since his re-election in 2022, the president has only had a relative majority in the National Assembly, forcing him to engage in endless and generally sterile negotiations with the opposition. Surprised, the French are preparing for this unexpected electoral appointment in a feverish and deleterious atmosphere that sees alliances being made and broken at an accelerated pace. Stunned, voters watch the parties' maneuvers, the backroom dealings, which appear out of step with the discontent expressed in a scathing way throughout the country. What are the reasons for the disavowal inflicted on the young president who came to power seven years ago and was re-elected two years ago?

The reasons for the anger
There are three main reasons for this—without, in my opinion, justifying it: First of all, the voters obviously wanted to punish the government for the loss of purchasing power and, even if this was not the subject of the vote, the opportunity seemed too good to them because in principle it had no consequences on a national scale—they had not anticipated the dissolution. The French have also spoken out against a Europe with blurred borders, literally and figuratively, and more particularly, against immigration perceived as a threat—especially to their security—because it is more imposed than wanted. Finally, they expressed their disappointment at a Europe of standards that they consider unbearable—a feeling expressed vehemently by farmers in particular (a paradoxical reaction even though we are in a society that constantly demands that the State guarantee life—just as many farmers have forgotten that they owe their survival to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and retain only the control over their activities—nitpicky, it is true—that results from it). As we can see, the most radical parties have prospered above all on fears: fear of impoverishment, fear of the other, and fear of the loss of sovereignty. This is all the more surprising given that academic studies show that although citizens fear the European machine, which they consider uncontrollable, they remain deeply attached to democratic values, to the euro, and to the security that they believe the Union guarantees.
To these reasons, I would add a fourth: the radicalization of the political debate, instrumentalized on the one hand by social networks—we are witnessing a 'TikTokization' of political language, which is extremely brutal and based on immediacy—and on the other hand by the media who have smelled blood, and indulge in dramatization staged by continuous news channels, which is often disconnected from the reality on the ground. I am not blaming the message carriers, I am simply saying that the unfiltered expression of social networks and the dramatization staged by continuous news channels are factors that distort trends and amplify threats.

A need for clarification
Faced with this situation, master of time, the President of the Republic made a drastic choice, that of dissolution—he had others at his disposal—triggering a real earthquake. Not because the Rassemblement National asked for it—the decision was already taken since it was announced within minutes of the polls closing—but to "clarify" the political and institutional game for which he is, by virtue of his function, accountable. It is a risky bet, as confirmed by the polls and also by the very strong aftershocks that followed the earthquake.
To begin with, the expected clarification does not seem to have taken place. According to a poll, 75% of French people were not convinced by the arguments put forward by Emmanuel Macron. The redefinition of the political panorama, currently underway, has not at this stage become much clearer, at least for citizens. The fact remains that it seems to lead to a redistribution of the political offer into three coherent yet heterogeneous blocs that do not replace the traditional right-left divide but complicate and amplify it by radicalizing it. Yes, it's true, the voter will go from choosing between thirty-eight lists in the European elections—38!—several of which have only collected, in the best of cases, a few scattered votes, to, overall, a choice between three main blocs: the presidential majority, stunned by the June 9 election, united in appearance but no doubt divided by muffled internal struggles with a view to the conquest of the leadership while Macron will not be able to run again in 2027; a bloc on the left, the Nouveau Front Populaire—a reference to the origins—dominated by the radical left led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon (who was saved by the dissolution when he was threatened with disappearing into the trapdoor of history) trying to give oxygen to a political family asphyxiated by its divisions, by federating it against the threat posed by Marine Le Pen's party; and the latter party, the Rassemblement National, surfing on the navy blue wave that gave it a clear victory in the European elections and which, "normalized" by its presence in the National Assembly since 2022, could win a large parliamentary majority tomorrow and be mechanically called upon to form the next government.
An uncertain calculation
Many say that the president's calculation was to entrust Le Pen—or her "creature", the young Jordan Bardella—with the task of forming the government in a new and fourth "cohabitation" (a situation where the exercise of power is shared between a president of the Republic elected by a direct majority and a Prime Minister supported by a different majority in the National Assembly) in the hope that voters will turn away in 2027 on the occasion of the presidential election. He would thus try to reproduce the scenario that benefited François Mitterrand in 1986 against Jacques Chirac, in 1993 to the benefit of Chirac against the left, and in 1997 to the benefit of Chirac again against Lionel Jospin, the left-wing Prime Minister eliminated in the first round in 2002 after five years of government, and Jean-Marie Le Pen—father of Marine Le Pen—in the second round afterwards. But history does not repeat the dishes indefinitely. First of all, all the protagonists now know how cohabitation works and everyone will be careful, if the situation is to occur, to do everything possible to change the situation. Secondly, it is clear that the country is embarking on a long period of polarization that will be marked by acrimonious political debate, at the expense of the country's economy and stability. This lack of definition is likely to aggravate the latent anxiety of the French.

The fear of fear
In my opinion, the four reasons set out above and explaining the current situation stem largely from the deep anguish that has gripped this aging country, aware of its fragility in a world undergoing profound change. The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, revealing the ongoing fragmentation of the international order put in place in the aftermath of the Second World War, the evolution of globalization and the perceived threat posed by emerging countries, global warming and its effects, and the dizzying digital revolution of artificial intelligence, are existential transformations that are worrying Europeans in general and the French in particular. We are experiencing here a "great fear"—fear of insecurity, fear of immigration, fear of health risks, fear of climate change—that is equivalent to that experienced at the turn of the first millennium. It seems that nearly one in two French people is afraid of the world and that the other half is afraid of those who are afraid. Rightly or wrongly, France is afraid of itself, of its vulnerability in the face of a world it no longer recognizes. Worried, it is tempted today by turning in on itself, excluding the other, and by the simplistic solutions to complex problems proposed to them by nationalists, populists, and demagogues.


Pierre Henri Guignard: Former Ambassador of France to Argentina (2016-2019), he published a biography this month: "The last diplomat writer: the life of Pierre-Jean Remy, immortal Excellency" (L'Harmattan)