24/07/2024

Hyper-Westernism, Milei, and National Interest

In 2022, 8 out of every 10 dollars received from the sale of Argentine products came from non-Western countries. What is at stake when foreign policy turns its back on its recent history?

Hyper-Westernism is a concept that refers to a peculiar type of foreign and defense policy within the logic of acquiescence, understood as a type of grand strategy in Anglo-Saxon terminology. In the article "Latin America and its Grand Strategies," Roberto Russell and I highlight that the options inherent to the logic of acquiescence are coupling, accommodation, and engagement. Coupling is characterized by the alignment with the strategic interests of a superpower—in this case, the United States—at the regional and global levels. Accommodation involves conceding to Washington's preferences or demands to avoid its displeasure or punishment and in the hope of future rewards. Engagement implies accompanying the White House, as a "proxy," in actions or policies towards third countries.

Hyper-Westernism articulates all three options of the logic of acquiescence simultaneously and combinedly, in a radicalized, active, and assertive manner.

Hyper-Westernism is peculiar because it manifests amidst the twilight of the Post-Cold War era. While there have been elements—crises and challenges—that have gradually marked the end of this short cycle of global politics for years, Ukraine first and Gaza later have epitomized the closure of that period in which the West was expected to assert its global dominance. Another peculiarity is that, in recent years, it has been rare for intermediate countries, regional powers, or emerging powers from the Global South to so visibly and intensely embrace the West. An additional peculiar element is that hyper-Westernism is ambitious: it does not seek to change foreign and defense policy in relevant aspects but to fully restructure both and sharply dismantle the proverbial lines of continuity. Undoubtedly, hyper-Westernism unfolds in specific speeches, measures, and votes: it is not a narrative or promise but a practice, a modus operandi.

Hyper-Westernism requires a domestic support base: there are internal forces that validate it in anticipation of gains and based on aversions. Finally, hyper-Westernism can obtain more and better international reception in certain countries due to two circumstances. On the one hand, the increased pugnacity between the United States and China, and on the other, the dictate of business. Regarding pugnacity with China, having countries that take unsolicited stances against Beijing sounds good to Washington—under Biden or Trump. It also sounds good to the European Union, which, unlike the United States, is attempting a more gradual decoupling from China but welcomes unsolicited hyper-Westernism.

Regarding the dictate of business, the erosion of democracy in Global North countries, the weakening of the key principles of international law, the need to contain and reverse China's power, and the revaluation of strategic resources (energy and minerals) gradually shift the gravity of values in the foreign policies of the United States and the EU.

On Libertarian Hyper-Westernism
In the case of Javier Milei, hyper-Westernism is based on a material purpose: having sufficient funds to be able to achieve dollarization. A goal that goes against the global de-dollarization process. Despite being gradual and complex, de-dollarization accompanies the power, prestige, and influence transition that characterizes the current moment. In fact, in 1977, the dollar reached a peak of 85% as the predominant currency in foreign exchange reserves. In 2001, the position was close to 73%, and today it stands at about 58%. The dollar's predominant position has been intertwined with the hegemonic position of the United States, and global transformations are affecting Washington's ability to maintain it. The Argentine government seems unaware of this situation, and today there is no medium or large-sized country in terms of geography, demography, and production seeking dollarization.

It is worth remembering that Argentina is the eighth-largest country in size, the 33rd in population, and the 24th in economic magnitude. In terms of dollarization, and considering the most recent Latin American cases, dollarization has only been implemented by Ecuador (76th in size, 72nd in population, and 64th in GDP) and El Salvador (149th in size, 108th in population, and 101st in GDP). The loss of national self-esteem is not an irrelevant factor that fuels, for part of an increasingly impoverished civil society and significant business segments, the seemingly life-saving idea of dollarization.

Argentine hyper-Westernism was presented in the announcement of the so-called "new foreign policy doctrine" by Milei. He did so before Laura Richardson, commander of the US Southern Command, in April. On that occasion, Javier Milei said, "Alliances must be anchored in a common worldview and must not submit to those who threaten Western values. This is based on the defense of life, liberty, and private property of individuals... Our alliance with the United States, demonstrated throughout these first months of office, is a declaration to the world."

If one looks at the president's prominent travels—four times to the United States between February and May this year and the trip to Israel in February where he announced moving the country's diplomatic headquarters from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; the most emblematic votes related to the Middle East in the Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly; the decision to buy modernized American F-16 planes instead of advanced Chinese JF-17 planes; the reception given to General Richardson in April—received as a Head of State and not as a commander of one of the eleven US Commands; the repeated references in personal messages and communications from the Foreign Ministry and the Casa Rosada, among other events and statements, two countries stand out: the United States and Israel. It is unusual for a government to be so emphatic about two nations and for the rest of the world to be of so little interest or public recognition. Typically, governments multiply and diversify their references to various counterparts to preserve and improve relations with a vast majority of nations.

An evident fact in the first semester of the libertarian administration is that behind each government stance there was a forgotten, mistreated, disqualified, disregarded, or disputed counterpart. The unprecedented pro-Washington fervor has been proportional to the unprecedented anti-Beijing hostility. The flag-waving with the West has sidelined complementary pillars in the region and the world; something even the governments of Carlos Menem and Mauricio Macri tried to maintain. The decision to reject joining the BRICS is incomprehensible. As an English saying aptly states, "You are either at the table or you are on the menu." There is no merit to deciding not to be at the BRICS table. It is worth remembering that in 2000 the combined GDP of G-7 countries was $21.9 trillion, and that of the BRICS was $10.8 trillion; today, it is, respectively, $55 trillion and $61.3 trillion. Furthermore, in 2022—a record year in national exports in terms of amounts—8 out of every 10 dollars received from the sale of Argentine product came from non-Western countries. It is also important to emphasize that BRICS members have historically supported Argentina's position on the Malvinas.

The country's drastic shift regarding the relocation of the Argentine Embassy in Israel and the Israeli-Palestine issue has been eloquent. It is worth noting that the location of the Argentine delegation in Israel was determined by a 1951 law during the government of Juan Domingo Perón. The most recent stance on Jerusalem was proclaimed in 2017, 24 hours after Donald Trump's decision to move the US diplomatic headquarters from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. During the administration of then-Foreign Minister Jorge Faurie, the Ministry issued a statement saying, "The Argentine Government finds it necessary to reaffirm its position in favor of a two-state solution living peacefully, respectfully, recognizing the 1967 borders and the special status of Jerusalem according to successive United Nations General Assembly resolutions... Like most of the international community, Argentina supports the special international regime of Jerusalem, as established by UNGA Resolution 181 (1947), as well as free access, visitation, and unrestricted transit to the Holy Places for the faithful of the 3 monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), so Argentina regrets unilateral measures that could alter this special status." The astounding silence regarding the potential relocation of the Argentine Embassy in Israel by the main PRO leaders, the officials of that party in the executive, and Faurie himself, now the country's ambassador to Chile, indicates the PRO's willingness to support the current government on this matter at any cost, thus forgetting their position from seven years ago. Furthermore, it is relevant to highlight that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation—the second largest after the UN—aimed at protecting the interests of the Muslim world, comprises 57 countries that have also supported Argentina's position on the Malvinas.

Additionally, Argentina recognized Palestine as a free and independent state in 2010, during the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, respecting Israel's right to live in peace and supporting initiatives for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2012, Argentina voted in favor (138 in favor, 9 against, and 41 abstentions) of Palestine becoming an observer state at the United Nations. During Mauricio Macri's government, notably in November 2018 during an escalation of violence in Gaza, Argentina continued to advocate for "the Palestinian people's right to build a free, independent, and viable state." At the very start of Milei’s government (12/12/2023), Argentina—that during Alberto Fernández’ government, had supported a similar resolution on the issue—abstained (153 in favor, 9 against, and 23 abstentions) in a resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. In May of this year, at the General Assembly, the Argentine government opposed (143 in favor, 9 against, and 25 abstentions) a resolution calling for the Security Council to grant full membership to Palestine. A few days ago, the president decided to cancel his attendance at the Islamic Cultural Center upon learning that the Palestinian Ambassador would be present there. This led to a reaction from the Arab League, consisting of 22 members, which considered it “a hostile and unjustified attitude, not only towards the State of Palestine but also towards the Arab Group, and regrets that such an undiplomatic and unacceptable stance was adopted by the president of a country for which Arabs have great respect due to its previous positive positions on the Palestinian cause.” It is important to recall that numerous Arab countries are members of the C-24, the Special Committee on Decolonization, which historically addresses the Malvinas issue.

Since the beginning of the libertarian administration, and as an example of another expressive shift in foreign policy, Latin America and South America have occupied a subsidiary position. A mix of neglect, introspection, and crudeness—along with some narcissism—seems to characterize the official view of the region. Personal and offensive attacks on leaders by Milei, the decision not to send ambassadors (even career diplomats) to certain countries, an average 25% reduction in imports from the region in the first half of 2024 (similar to the global trend), the absence of presidential visits to MERCOSUR countries—contrary to the usual practice in democratic governments at the start of a term—the terse and minimal response to the assault on the Mexican Embassy in Ecuador (referred to by the Foreign Ministry as “what happened”), marked disinterest in CELAC (which Argentina presided over in 2022) and UNASUR (whose first Secretary was Néstor Kirchner), and the tense presidential relations with the main regional partner, Brazil, among other issues, demonstrate disdain and disregard towards the region. It is also crucial to highlight the region's support for Argentina regarding the Malvinas. Weakening this support front is senseless.

A few days ago, the government decided to join the Contact Group on Ukraine Defense Affairs, created by Washington in 2022 to channel military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. In this context, Defense Minister Luis Petri stated: “We cannot allow tyranny to prevail, we cannot remain indifferent to the suffering of our brothers and sisters in Ukraine. Let us fight for a free world; it is a struggle we will never regret. And as my President says, Long live Freedom, Dammit!” There was no public explanation or justification for this decision, which could have serious and unpredictable consequences. This decision involves adopting a high profile, strengthening ties with the West, to gain NATO's Global Partner status and demonstrate pro-Western alignment through a conspicuous stance against Russia at a time when Moscow has managed to halt the so-called Ukrainian counter-offensive. It might be worth mentioning the Russian position regarding the Malvinas. In 2014, during his visit to the country, Vladimir Putin noted: “Russia continues to support the need to find a solution to the dispute over the Malvinas Islands through direct negotiations between Great Britain and Argentina.” In March 2023, in a note in United Russia, former President Dmitry Medvedev highlighted Argentina's ongoing pursuit of the islands: “Buenos Aires' commitment to continuing its just struggle for sovereignty over the disputed territories clearly showed the course towards... the fight against the shameful practices of neocolonialism” by the United Kingdom.

Finally, it is crucial to emphasize something that would appear to be off the radar of many specialists and communicators: Argentina's progressive withdrawal from priority issues in global politics. On matters such as gender, human rights, climate change, social justice, and health, among others, the government has been adopting positions contrary to the progress made during democracy and against the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Paradoxically, an administration that has shown no interest in securing national sovereignty on priority issues, whether strategic, geopolitical, or economic-financial, argues from a sovereigntist perspective against or not supporting a global agenda that, at one time, was promoted by both Western and Global South countries (including Argentina). For example, at the Commission on the Status of Women meeting in New York, in March, Argentina's critical position was identical to that of countries such as Russia, Iran, Nigeria, Iraq, and Nicaragua. In June, in Geneva, Argentina opposed the treaty against pandemics negotiated within the framework of the World Health Organization since 2021. The tweet by Foreign Minister Diana Mondino on June 9 is clear: “Under no circumstances will we allow an international organization to infringe upon our sovereignty, much less to confine us again.” So far, there have been no reactions from Western countries, which are the natural focus of libertarian hyper-Westernism. For now, the place of values in relations with the country seems to be quite relegated. Washington and Brussels will be tolerant as long as their business dealings thrive, and the anti-China stance is consolidated. That is their realpolitik.

On National Interest

The term "national interest," ambiguous and polysemous, has guided the foreign policy of states. There are several underlying precepts worth noting:

National interest is best safeguarded in conditions of global peace. Peace is known to contribute to the material and spiritual well-being of nations; conversely, war damages domestic prosperity and destroys international coexistence.

Regional order and stability are essential for development, security, and autonomy; this strengthens national interest. Diplomatic resources are fundamental for the pacification and harmony among countries in a region, and therefore, political détente and the resolution of disputes are indispensable.

It is vital not to attract or get involved in extra-regional conflicts, as this can severely affect not only the national interest but also that of neighboring countries. This is even more imperative when one lacks control or influence over the main variables that led to and sustain the conflict. Additionally, it is costly and counterproductive to become a source of insecurity in the neighborhood by importing conflict from outside the area.

It is essential to clearly understand the interests at play with different counterparts, identifying the coinciding, complementary, and conflicting interests. One should always keep in mind that such a variety of interests is not immutable, as the type of interest with a particular counterpart can change over time and with diplomacy.

Any definition, safeguarding, and promotion of national interest requires knowing the attributes effectively available for mobilization. Ignorance or confusion in this regard can severely damage a country’s foreign policy and defense efforts.

The corollary of successful protection and projection of national interest is the increase in the actual relative power of a nation, both in its tangible capabilities (material improvement) and intangible ones (increased prestige). Pyrrhic victories are not signs of success; they are merely temporary and reversible.

It is crucial not to confuse permanent interests with transient ones; the former are constant in their centrality and over time, while the latter are subject to political circumstances. Essentially, permanent interests should not be sacrificed to satisfy the transient interests of an administration, a party, or an individual.

It will be imperative to evaluate the specific results of Javier Milei’s hyper-Westernism considering its impact on the national interest. It is still premature to make a complete and definitive assessment, but when the time comes, it will be necessary to evaluate what this government has contributed to and what it has squandered regarding Argentina’s national interest.

Juan Gabriel Tokatlian holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (Washington). He is a Full Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Torcuato Di Tella University. He lived in Colombia for 18 years, where he was an Associate Professor at the National University of Colombia (Bogotá) and a principal researcher at the Institute of Political Studies and International Relations (IEPRI). He was also a co-founder and Vice-Rector of the Center for International Studies (CEI) at the University of the Andes (Bogotá).

*Article originally published in Cenital