17/09/2025

CHINA FACING THE UNITED STATES

“The world has shifted toward a period of transition in the direction of multipolarity, since the disintegration of the bipolar structure. People had expected that the end of the Cold War would bring peace and prosperity to the world. In reality, there are now better prospects of avoiding a new world war and securing lasting peace. Nevertheless, the contradictions that were latent during the Cold War began to emerge, and the manifestations of hegemonic will and power politics in international relations are increasing. The peace and development so ardently desired by humanity still face serious challenges...”

Statement by former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen during the Forty-Eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 29, 1993.

The prescient words of former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the United Nations in 1993 still resonate today for their striking relevance. More than three decades after that diagnosis, the accumulation of geopolitical, commercial, financial, and military tensions casts doubt on the long-awaited peace and global stability of the post–Cold War era, in which utopias such as “the end of history” predominated. Today, political realism—exposed in seemingly endless wars and overlapping territorial claims—crudely reveals the persistence of Hobbesian principles applied to the international (dis)order, far removed from Kantian perpetual peace.

As then, but with greater intensity, calls for active and binding multilateralism often fall on deaf ears under the weight of tragedies such as the Russia–Ukraine war, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, tensions in the South China Sea, periodic border clashes between India and Pakistan, or the alarming threat of nuclear weapons being used to achieve the illusory goal of territorial victory. Even South America seems unable to escape these destructive logics, with dormant territorial disputes resurfacing after decades. A clear indicator of the change of era is the record increase in global military spending, which, according to SIPRI, reached $2.7 trillion in 2024. A painful contradiction: in an age of artificial intelligence (AI) boom, humanity seems to drift toward instinctive and irrational decisions reminiscent of prehistory, giving expedited channel to military diplomacy rather than negotiation to de-escalate tensions.

At the epicenter of these global tensions lies the strategic confrontation between China and the United States, whose shadow covers every corner of the planet, whether terrestrial, insular, or maritime. It is a conflict fought on several fronts simultaneously, but mainly in the Asia-Pacific and Indian regions, with the United States attempting to “contain” China through a combination of economic pressure, trade sanctions, defensive alliances, and military power.

TECHNOLOGICAL, COMMERCIAL, AND FINANCIAL AUTONOMY

But is today’s China the same one that Trump confronted during his first presidency, between 2017 and 2020? The answer is no. A resilient China is increasingly defiant in the face of U.S. pressure, backed by renewed capacities acquired over the last decade in commerce, finance, technology, military strength, and even culture (soft power). A defiant China consolidates its rigid stance against the United States, further supported by its alliance with Russia.

How has it achieved this? Commercially, China anticipated the rise of global protectionist pressures and therefore adjusted its growth drivers to mitigate external sector impacts. It was able to withstand punitive measures imposed during Trump’s first presidency and, amid the pandemic, reconfigured logistics chains, promoted industrial robotization, and reaffirmed goals of endogenous technological development outlined in the “Made in China 2025” plan.

Despite international sanctions, China is now the world’s leading automobile producer, surpassing U.S. and European automakers in design, technology, and AI applications (producing an estimated 30.2 million vehicles in 2025). Likewise, tariff increases since 2017 spurred gains in competitiveness. This dynamic was accompanied by a reorientation of trade flows: if in 2016 its main partners were the EU, the U.S., Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia, by 2024 the EU had lost the top spot to the United States, followed by South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Russia (mainly oil and gas) and Brazil, now becoming the “breadbasket” of a China seeking to diversify agri-food supply risks, also entered the list of main partners.

In the technological sphere, China is advancing at hypersonic speed. Beijing has set the goal of becoming a leading space power by 2045, with long-term plans that include sending manned spacecraft to the Moon by 2030 and developing nuclear-powered space shuttles by 2040. State-owned companies, along with thousands of start-ups, provide innovations supported by high-tech clusters in cities such as Shenzhen, Chongqing, Xi’an, and Beijing. Other areas of progress include public service management, 5G networks, cloud computing, big data, and AI. A sensitive chapter links the production of advanced chips to the Taiwan issue, where TSMC produces about 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. In short, U.S. sanctions and prohibitions on exporting advanced technologies to Chinese industries only reinforced the conviction of deepening “technological autonomy” among Chinese leaders.

Completing the picture of high-tech advances is the state-owned Satellite Network Group project, which mirrors Starlink and plans to launch approximately 26,000 satellites by 2029, forming a global Internet constellation—an initiative also known as the “Space Silk Road”—further closing the gap with the United States. Another front of attack by the current U.S. administration is China’s ambition to increase the yuan’s international position in financial and trade transactions. In 2010, the U.S. dollar’s share of China’s external receipts and payments exceeded 80%, but by 2023 it had fallen below 50%.

CONCLUSIONS

Today’s China makes decisions having learned lessons not only from the Cold War but also from the evolution of U.S. power, whose decline it considers inexorable. Therefore, to the question of where China is heading, the words spoken by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 61st Munich Security Conference in February 2025 provide some clues. On that occasion, following the line of his predecessor Qian Qichen, he stated:

“Many people are asking: ‘Where is the world heading?’ Perhaps I could borrow the title of this year’s Munich Security Report. We are moving toward multipolarity. When they were founded 80 years ago, the United Nations had only 51 member states. Today, 193 countries are on board the same giant ship. A multipolar world is not only a historical necessity. It is also becoming a reality.”

Perhaps the Trump administration should read Chinese messages and speeches more carefully to see that the world has changed—and China even more so: the new balance of power reveals a more assertive, confident, and resilient China in the face of external pressure. Within this complex framework, the Global South is also moving its pieces, betting on stability, consensus, and multilateralism.

Sergio Cesarin is coordinator of the Center for Studies on the Asia-Pacific and India (CEAPI) at the National University of Tres de Febrero (UNTREF) and a researcher at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET).